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Abstract
Climate change mitigation is a shared global challenge that involves collective action of a
set of individuals with different tendencies to cooperation. However, we lack an understand-
ing of the effect of resource inequality when diverse actors interact together towards a com-
mon goal. Here, we report the results of a collective-risk dilemma experiment in which
groups of individuals were initially given either equal or unequal endowments. We found that
the effort distribution was highly inequitable, with participants with fewer resources contribut-
ing significantly more to the public goods than the richer −sometimes twice as much. An
unsupervised learning algorithm classified the subjects according to their individual behav-
ior, finding the poorest participants within two “generous clusters” and the richest into a
“greedy cluster”. Our results suggest that policies would benefit from educating about fair-
ness and reinforcing climate justice actions addressed to vulnerable people instead of
focusing on understanding generic or global climate consequences.
Introduction
Mitigating anthropogenic climate change is a complex problem involving many heterogeneous
actors with different agendas and socioeconomic conditions [1–5]. While climate change miti-
gation requires a collective action, it is not clear what are the effects of the inherent diversity of
the agents involved in it [6]. There is the risk that the poor exploits the rich, i.e., that the largest
beneficiaries of a common goods bear a disproportionately large burden in its production [7].
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Conversely, the poor also have an incentive to contribute since they are risking as much as any
other in the event of a catastrophic development.
Inequality between actors is a widespread situation related to climate change mitigation
which occurs at all the socioeconomic scales, from large nations and corporations to citizens
that share a given urban space. For instance, increasing green spaces and similar actions that
improve urban environmental health are part of the Nationally Determined Contributions
(NDCs) within the Paris Agreement (COP21) [8, 9]. However, these actions impact differently
more and less affluent citizens and, in fact, such actions have also been questioned from the
perspective of environmental justice [10]. This is the reason for the increasing interest in link-
ing climate justice with socio-economic inequalities and in incorporating some behavioral
aspects in city policy [11]. Therefore, understanding how to deal with climate change mitiga-
tion in an economically diverse world and in an environmentally fair manner is of special
interest. This has become more timely and pressing with the withdrawal [12] of the second
largest CO2 emitter [13] from COP21.
Resource heterogeneity and environmental justice can be very suitably framed within the
collective-risk dilemma experimental setup introduced by Milinski et al. a decade ago [14]. In
this framework, to be described in detail below, groups of people have to work together to
reach a common goal by making contributions from an initial endowment. If the goal is
reached, every individual receives the part of the money not contributed. If not, a catastrophe
occurs with certain probability, and all participants lose all the money they had kept. While
many experimental and theoretical studies have considered different aspects of climate change
within this framework [15–32], the issue of heterogeneity has only been considered in three
experiments framed in the climate change issue. Tavoni et al. [16] included inequality by sepa-
rating the participants into two groups with different starting endowments, and found that the
common goal was less likely to be reached. However, when they allowed participants to com-
municate their intentions, the probability of reaching the target goal increased again, similarly
to conditional cooperation in public goods games [33]. On the other hand, Milinski et al. [17]
observed that when they included rich and poor subjects, rich ones substituted for missing
contributions by the poor provided intermediate climate targets, however, despite this increase
in the contributions of the rich, the final target was reached less often than the intermediate
target. Finally, Burton-Chellew and colleagues [21] proposed a game with four conditions
varying the initial endowments and/or the risk of a catastrophic climate event. They found
that inequality in both endowments and risk decreased cooperation, that is to say, selfishness
emerged when rich were less at risk. However, some rich players were still reluctant to cooper-
ate when they suffered the higher risk. It seems that climate change awareness could have
mediated their responses, since it was found to be proportional with individual contributions.
Outside of the climate change framing, studies on the role of heterogeneous endowments in
public goods games are not conclusive, with different experiments leading to different results
[34–36]. Therefore, new studies are needed to understand the influence of heterogeneity in
threshold public goods games.
Here, we extend the knowledge on the effects of resource heterogeneity in collective dilem-
mas in two main directions. First, we include broader capital distributions, thus representing
more closely the diversity in resource availability among the members of a given collective
public goods game, e.g., between different countries worldwide or inhabitants in a given urban
context. Second, and most importantly, we go beyond aggregate results to analyze the behavior
of individuals by means of agnostic classification tools that allow us to identify differences
between the behavior of subjects with the same resources. We complement this analysis with a
questionnaire probing into the subjects’ knowledge of the climate change crisis and the influ-
ence of such knowledge in their actions. Therefore, we provide a much more complete picture
Inequality and fairness in climate change actions
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of the influence of inequality that encompasses both the collective (reaching the common goal)
and the individual (how different individuals behave under different circumstances) visions of
the problem. Such a two-level approach is the best option in order to identify how agents react
to resource heterogeneity and what actions must be taken to promote environmental justice.
As we show below, our findings allow to hint directions for policy measures targeted to specific
collectives.
Materials and methods
The experiment was conducted following the lab-in-the-field experiment guidelines used in
[37], which helped us recruiting participants from a general audience by using opportunistic
recruitment, opposed to the typical samples of university undergraduate students. All partici-
pants in the experiment signed an informed consent to participate and no association was ever
made between their real names and the results, in agreement with the Spanish Law for Per-
sonal Data Protection. This procedure was approved by the Ethics Committee of Universidad
Carlos III de Madrid, and all methods were performed in accordance with the relevant guide-
lines and regulations. The experiment was conducted in different sessions in the DAU fair in
Barcelona during two days (December 12-13, 2015) by means of the Citizen Social Lab plat-
form developed ad hoc for this experiment [38]. The total number of games was 54, the num-
ber of participants in our experiment was 324 subjects, adding up to a total of 3240 game
decisions collected. If some participant was non-responsive, the experimental platform took
over and make the contribution randomly for her; in that case the data was labeled and the
subject’s decisions were discarded in the analysis. The total number of subjects with uncor-
rupted decisions are 320 (134 women, 41.8%) leading to a total number of valid decisions of
3200. The age ranged from 11 to 73 years, 32.15 (13.04) on average (SD), there are no signifi-
cant differences between the behaviour of minors (< 18) and adults at the level of individual
contribution, nor between games in which there are minors and adults coexisting and in
which there are only adults (S2 and S3 Tables). Almost half of the sample was graduated
(48%), whereas the other half was equally distributed between different educational levels (i.e.
professional training (16%), elementary (11%), middle (11%) and high school (12%). Most of
the participants were naïve to social experiments (N = 279, 86%). Average (SD) earnings were
18.21 € (8.8) (S14 Fig) and the average (SD) duration of a game (considering only the time of
decision making) was 82.21s (20.98), hence the average round time was 8.22s (S15 Fig).
Before starting the game, all the participants were shown a brief tutorial (S16 Fig) in the tab-
let in which the experiment was implemented. Researchers present in the experiment reviewed
the instructions with them to guarantee they were understanding the basics of the experiment.
Participants were reminded that they had to make a decision on each round on how much
money they want to contribute to the common goal, but they were not instructed in any partic-
ular way nor with any particular goal in mind.
The subjects participated in groups of six players, each subject was assigned with an initial
capital (20 € to 60 €), and the goal of the game was to contribute 120 € on a common fund
between all of them. During the game the subjects had to contribute into the common fund
between 0 € and 4 € during 10 rounds. At the end of each round all players saw the informa-
tion of how much money has been contributed to the common fund, and they also saw the
individual contributions of the six players in the previous round and the total amount contrib-
uted by each player up to this round (S16 Fig). If the goal was reached at the end of the game,
all the participants kept the money that they had not contributed in the form of a gift card. The
120 € collected in the pot will be used once the research is published in organizing an event
that includes an action against climate change (the action will consist in planting trees in a
Inequality and fairness in climate change actions
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forest in Barcelona within the Day of the Tree event organized by an NGO [39]) and where
there will be a dissemination of the current results. Otherwise, if the common fund did not
reach 120 € at the end of the game, we did use the contribution to take any action against cli-
mate change and the participants only kept the remaining money with a probability of 10%.
Statistical analysis
Numerical data representing payoff and contributions are expressed as mean±SE with a 95%
CI. The sociodemographic (age and effect of minors), as well as earnings and time of decision-
making are expressed as average (SD) and in the respective figures as standard error of the
mean (95% CI). To control for potential sociodemographic data that could have an influence
over the participant’s responses we used GLMM [40] with sex, age, education and the 2- and
3-way interaction between sex, age, education, followed by linear regression post test to estab-
lish the direction of the causality found at the educational level. Comparisons between average
contribution and qualitative responses to question 3 (reaching the threshold) were conducted
with non-parametric Chi Square. To explore how attitudes towards proportionality affected
contributions, we sorted contributions according to the binomial response in question 7
(group 1 against group 2) and used non-parametric test for independent samples (Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test) for comparison. To mesure the differences among minors and adults in
terms of contributions (both group and individual), we conducted Welch two sample t-test.
Finally, to measure the robustness and stability of a given cluster we use consensus cluster met-
rics as item-consensus and cluster-consensus [41].
Results
The collective risk dilemma game
The original collective-risk dilemma [14] introduced groups of six people where each person
receives an initial capital (40 €) and the common goal of the group is to collect 120 € that will
be invested in mitigating climate change (by publishing an ad in a national newspaper). The
game consists of 10 rounds, and at every round each subject decides how much she contributes
to the common fund (0 €, 2 €, or 4 €). If the goal is reached at (or before) the end of the game,
all participants keep the money that they have not contributed. Otherwise, the participants
only keep the remaining money with a probability which in [14] was 90%, 50%, or 10% (equiv-
alently, a climatic catastrophe occurred with probability 10%, 50%, or 90%). In addition, in
this case no money goes to climate change mitigation. The main result was that most groups
did not reach the goal, and even in the worst case scenario (catastrophe probability 90%) only
about half of the groups avoided climate change. We reproduced the original dilemma with
the worst case scenario and the exact same configuration as our baseline treatment, and we
carried out sessions with wealth heterogeneity for comparison with the homogeneous one.
To introduce inequality, we distributed six different windfall starting capitals (20 €, 30 €, 40
€, 40 €, 50 €, and 60 €) randomly amongst the participants. In half of the games the partici-
pants could invest 0 €, 2 €, or 4 € per round as in the above setup, while in the other half of the
games we allowed them more flexible choices, namely 0 €, 1 €, 2 €, 3 €, and 4 € per round (see
S1 File Section 1.2). In all cases we informed the participants that in case they reached the goal
of 120 €, the collected money would be used for a reforestation action by planting trees in a
nearby park with the help of an NGO organisation [39]. Finally, after the experiment, we asked
our subjects to answer a questionnaire (see S1 File Section 1.8) to have an individual assess-
ment of climate change awareness and predisposition to collaborate in common actions that
could be further correlated with the individual’s contributions.
Inequality and fairness in climate change actions
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Equilibria and fair distribution
In our heterogeneous version of the collective-risk dilemma, there are very many Nash equilib-
ria [42], which make claiming that particular behavior should be expected very difficult.
Indeed, in the homogeneous case, the number of equilibria can be refined by imposing sym-
metry (meaning that all subjects, being equal, should choose the same contribution and, there-
fore, obtain the same payoff). Then, two equilibria are left, with individuals either contributing
nothing or contributing exactly 20 €. Of course, these equilibria refer only to accumulated con-
tribution along the game; considering the different sequences of investments in the 10 rounds
recovers the multiplicity of equilibria and we will not consider them.
In our unequal setup we have 5 types of players (there are two endowed with 40 €) and the
symmetry refinement no longer holds. Subjects contributing nothing is still a Nash equilib-
rium that leads to expected gains of 10% of every subject’s endowment. It is then easy to show
that any combination of individual total investments that adds up to exactly 120 € such that
every player makes more money than in the “contribute nothing” case is also an equilibrium.
Therefore, there is not a clear theoretical prediction about what should happen in our hetero-
geneous version of the game.
While in the equal case in which the fair share behaviour was given by equal contribution
and equal payoff (50% of the endowment in both cases), the asymmetric capital distribution in
the unequal scenario requires three different concepts of fairness based on the same ideas. The
first one refers to the equal payoff, “payoff fairness” (Fig 1b); the second one considers the cri-
terion of equal contribution, “contribution fairness” (Fig 1a); and, finally we also analyze a
“relative fairness” based on contributing half of the endowment (Fig 1c). The definitions of
these quantifications of fairness are as follows: “payoff fairness” considers as fair behaviour the
one in which each participant contributes an amount resulting in the same final payoff for all
(i.e. 20 €). This means that participants receiving an endowment of 20 € should contribute 0 €,
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https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204369.g001
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participants with an endowment of 30 € should contribute 10 €, and so on. “Contribution fair-
ness” defines as fair an equal contribution (20 €) of each participant independently of the
endowment. Finally, “relative fairness” considers as fair a 50% contribution of every subject’s
initial endowment (i.e. 10 € for participants starting with 20 €, 15 € for participants starting
with 30 €, and so on).
Among these possibilities, we decided to take the “relative fairness” as the main reference
for the discussion of our results, which is the most representative of the inequalities generated
by the participation in the game. If the participants contribute following “payoff fairness”, they
start from a position of inequality (participants endowments from 20 € to 60 €) and once the
game finishes their payoff is the same for all of them (20 €), breaking and unbalancing the ini-
tial inequalities due to the participation in the game. On the other hand, “contribution fair-
ness” does not consider endowments at all, and therefore the initial inequality. However, in
the case of “relative fairness”, after participating in the game the subjects maintain the same
inequality distribution they started with. Therefore, we believe that this definition allows us to
analyze the impact of the collective action in a more equitable and proportional way.
Collective climate action
In all games played in our experiment, the participants reached the goal irrespective of the ini-
tial endowments being equal or unequal. In the former case, our result has to be compared
with only 50% success rate for the groups in [14]. An increase in groups reaching the target
has been observed in other similar studies carried out later [17]. The evolution of the games
also differ from previous experiments (see Fig 2): In all the treatments in our experiment, the
sum of money accumulated at the end of each round is always above the fair contribution (12
€ per round), that is, participants contribute much more in the initial rounds, making the
group reach the goal faster, and then they stop contributing at the end once the goal has been
secured (S2 and S5 Figs). In contrast, the original results in [14] showed contributions below
the fair one until the end of the game, and those groups that reached the goal did it by increas-
ing their contributions in the last rounds.
Effect of unequal capital distribution
Fig 3 presents the average amount of capital contributed as a function of the initial capital of
the participants. We observe that, in terms of absolute contribution, the subjects with high
endowments, 50 € and 60 €, are the ones that contribute the most, 2.6 ± 0.13 € and 2.8 ± 0.12 €
per round respectively (mean±SE). Participants with low-endowments, 20 € and 30 €, contrib-
ute the least,1.4 ± 0.11 € and 2 ± 0.15 € respectively. However, this comparison is not the best
for interpreting the obtained results, since the initial capital of the poorest players only allows
them to contribute a maximum of 2 € per round (earning 0 at the end). Therefore, the compar-
ison makes more sense in terms of the percentage of capital contributed relative to their total
capital, which in turn allows to discuss the results using the “relative fairness” as reference (Fig
4). Strikingly, we observe that the most affluent (endowments of 60 €) are the ones that con-
tribute proportionally less, with around 46.6% of their initial capital, while the poorest (starting
with 20 €) contribute around 71.4% of their initial capital which shows their vulnerability
when facing the collective risk dilemma. Fig 3 shows very clearly the stark contrast between
the two visions. To put this result further in context, we notice that the maximum contribution
from participants with an endowment of 20 € (2 € per round) implies an effort of 2 times the
fair contribution, whereas for participants with an endowment of 60 €, the effort of contribut-
ing 2 € per round is 0.66 times the fair contribution. Therefore, in that case, contributing 2 €
have unequal impacts in the capital of subjects: the poorest participants, contributing 1.4 € on
Inequality and fairness in climate change actions
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204369 October 31, 2018 6 / 17
average, make a larger effort than wealthy participants contributing 2.8 €, which is even below
their fair share of the threshold.
Individual behaviors
Once we have looked at the average evolution of the different groups, we focus on the individ-
ual behavior and study whether participants with the same starting capital behave similarly.
We characterize the set of decisions taken by each participant with a vector, grouping decisions
by the capital on the common fund at the beginning of the round (see S1 File Section 1.3 for a
more detailed explanation). This is motivated by the intuition that subjects choose their
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24 valid games in which all players are endowed with 40 €, and the unequal treatment consists of 26 valid games where the initial endowments of 20 €, 30 €, 40
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contributions as a function of their endowment but also taking into account the current situa-
tion and whether the goal is closer or farther. In turn, we can monitor how the contributions
differ depending on the stage of the game where they are (S6 and S7 Figs). Next, in order to
detect, identify and characterize different types of behavioral patterns, we use an unsupervised
learning algorithm, namely Ward’s hierarchical clustering method [43, 44] with squared
Euclidean distances. Additionally, we used a consensus clustering to look for the optimal sub-
division of our data into groups as well as for the robustness of each group (see S1 File Section
1.4). This allowed us to find the groups that better fit the collected data as well as a much more
stable solution [41].
In Fig 5a and 5b we present the results of the clustering of the participants of the homoge-
neous treatment, with equal capital distribution. In this scenario the optimal number of groups
identified is two. Looking at the results of the clustering we immediately identify two different
types of behaviors, a group of generous participants (cluster 1) that contribute above the fair
contribution, and a group of more greedy participants that contribute around the fair contri-
bution at the beginning of the game and decrease their contribution as they approach the end
of the game (but before reaching the goal).
The results for the unequal treatment in Fig 5c and 5d show that the optimal division of the
participants is into three groups, being clusters 2 and 3 those gathering the majority of subjects
(92.55%), similarly to the equal treatment. Nevertheless, in this case emerge a minority group
(7.45%) of hyper-generous individuals (cluster 1) that contributes far beyond what we are
considering fair. And, again, in cluster 2 the subjects contribute on average more than the fair
contribution, whereas in cluster 3 the average contributions are around the fair value at the
beginning, but as the game approaches the end they decrease below the fair amount. We also
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observe in this treatment that subjects of the hyper-generous group increase their contribu-
tions significantly after the initial rounds, while the rest of the groups maintain or decrease
their contribution as the game advances.
In this latter framework, participants have different initial endowments. Thus, it is interest-
ing to check how these subjects are distributed in each of the three groups based on their rela-
tive contribution. Fig 5d shows that subjects with fewer resources (20 €-30 €) than the rest
are concentrated in the generous clusters (1 and 2). In fact, the cluster 1 (the hyper-generous
group) is formed exclusively by subjects with low endowments. On the other hand, the third
cluster is mainly composed by subjects with mid and high endowments. This means that the
majority of low endowed participants, 73.07% (20 €) and 62.96% (30 €) contributed above the
fair threshold, different from the subjects with high endowments, where only 51.85% (50 €)
and 18.51% (60 €) contributed a fair amount. Interestingly, the comparison of Fig 5b and 5d
shows that subjects with mid endowments (40 €-50 €) distributed among the two clusters not
very differently from the equal treatment. Therefore, the richest participants were those who
diverged from that distribution.
Effect of awareness about climate change
All groups reached the goal. Although climate awareness has proven to have an effect on indi-
vidual responses [21], the majority of our sample (N = 294, 91.3%) failed basic questions about
climate change concepts, in a questionnaire that included basic questions about the green-
house effect, carbon footprint, or the Kyoto Protocol (see S1 File Section 1.8). We stress that
this is so even if the experiment was done the week following the COP21 summit in Paris,
which had led us to expect much more familiarity of our subjects with climate change. This
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result allows us to exclude that more literacy and more public outreach efforts on climate
change are the reasons for the participants reaching the goal in all cases.
Effect of socio-demographics and beliefs
No significant differences were observed in terms of age or gender of the participants. How-
ever, educational level was a factor that significantly affected the average contribution
(GLMM, χ2 = 3.811, df = 1, p = .006). Subjects with lower education level were predicted to
make higher contributions in equal conditions (F(1,156) = 7.219, p<.05). In addition, before
starting the game a third part of the sample (N = 112, 34.8%) expected to arrive to the common
goal. Harboring this previous expectation did not have an influence over their average contri-
bution (χ2 = 6.005, df = 3, p = .111).
Importantly, we detect some inconsistencies between belief and behavior. The majority of
the sample (around 87%) claimed that their contributions should not depend on the co-partic-
ipant’s contribution, but the existence of different clusters shows that they did take the accu-
mulated capital into account to decide their next contribution. In addition, more than half of
the participants (N = 214, 66%) defended the idea of relative fairness (e.g. agreed with the
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statement “Contributions should be proportional to the initial capital so that players with
more capital should contribute more to the pool”). In contrast, those who firmly agreed with
proportionality in the unequal conditions contributed less than those who did not strongly
support that (Z = -2.653, p< .05), especially when their initial endowment was high. For
example, the participants with a starting capital of 60 € that adhered to “proportionate contri-
butions” contributed an average of 2.6 € per round, whereas those with the same initial endow-
ment who did not firmly claim that contributed 3.05 € per round.
Effect of generosity on emergence of inequality
Finally, we measured what the impact of this selfless behaviour among the poorest participants
on the global inequality was. Gini Coeficcient, apart from a standard way to calculate inequal-
ity levels in economics, is completely appropriate here since general behaviour consisting on
contributing the fair share would leave the value of Gini Coefficient constant (S13 Fig). Thus,
in the equal treatment the Gini Coefficient increases from 0 (initial distribution) to 0.1806 at
the end of the experiment, whereas in the unequal treatment increases from 0.1812 to 0.3483.
Discussion
Our experimental results allow us to conclude that inequalities may lead to unexpected prob-
lems in climate change mitigation, mostly related to environmental justice. Interestingly,
knowledge about climate change facts did not play a relevant role in the average contributions
to the common fund. This might indicate that policies mainly addressed to increase climate
change awareness might not be the most efficient solution to foster cooperation, and suggests
that emphasizing a correct interpretation of the perceived effects might be more useful in this
regard.
Even if all groups avoided the climatic catastrophe, our work shows that other potentially
serious issues may arise in the process. A particularly important one is that disadvantaged indi-
viduals are contributing much more than a fair share of the mitigation, and that the richest
ones are contributing less. It is telling that all hyper-generous behavior is observed in the two
poorest types of individuals, while a large majority of those endowed with the largest amount
behaved selfishly (irrespective of what they claim to believe about fair contributions, as we
have seen). It thus appears that, contrary to the expectations of the poor exploiting the rich in a
public goods context, here we found the opposite situation. This result has also been pointed
out in other studies with even higher unequality [45], where they also observe a selfish behav-
ior of the richest participants.
At this point, it is important to note that these experiments were done in a short period of
time and therefore they do not inform about long-term behavior. It would be possible that the
fact that the poor contributed more for a long time might eventually lead them to stop doing so,
thus jeopardizing the collective goal. The decisions we observed in the experiment did not allow
us to learn about the behavior of the richest players in that case, i.e., whether or not they would
jump in to solve the problem (although the results in [17] suggest that this could be the case).
Finally, it is important to discuss the different behaviors observed in the collectives we have
worked with. Education does not help here: less educated-less favored participants contributed
more to the collective goal than more educated-more favored ones. This could indicate that
there is an underlying cultural assumption of sacrifice of the most disadvantaged people
(related to their vulnerability): in a situation where the poorest are the ones who will face the
worst consequences, more advantaged participants may feel inclined to contribute less to solv-
ing the problem. Particularly alarming is the fact that, in the group of the richest participants,
about 80% behaved in a selfish manner. As this is the group that had the largest means to help
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to mitigate climate change, their fault to contribute may jeopardize the whole society, which
calls for specific actions to work with this segment of the population while providing addi-
tional policies to protect more disadvantaged groups or collectives.
To suggest new ways to initiate a collective climate action according to our findings, firstly
it is worth noting some differences of our study with a real world situation. For example,
similar to [21], our participants gathered information about their co-participants’ responses
whereas particular information from others (i.e. foreign countries or other communities shar-
ing space in a city) may not be available, reliable, or complete in the real world. Therefore, to
foster cooperation, future policies may benefit from making data and contributions public and
transparent. Moreover, our experimental subjects held unambiguous responsibility over their
actions whereas climate change is a global problem with diffuse shared duties. In this sense we
have proven that a good general education is not the remedy to avoid inequality in contribu-
tion, but promoting collective rather than parochial attitudes, which has proven to be one fac-
tor underlying cooperation [45], may be a better solution to make individuals assume their
responsibilities. Finally, we used an economic paradigm to establish a concrete threshold to be
reached so that our subjects received the economic consequences directly and immediately
once the game was over, however the Nature’s threshold is more uncertain [46] and conse-
quences can spread out over generations. Monetizing Nature by establishing concrete thresh-
olds to be reached in a particular time period and rewarding the population if they enact some
actions (i.e. return taxes if substituting diesel oil cars with electric vehicles or if groups of
neighbors install and maintain a rooftop garden on their own buildings) may work to address
people towards a general cooperation.
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